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Comparative constitutionalism today is the study of constitu-
tional change. All over the world, and with breathtaking speed, coun-
tries are transitioning to new democratic orders. It is in this context
that the United States Constitution celebrates its bicentennial. The
world's most enduring constitution has long been the leading model
for slow constitutional change. Nonetheless, in recent Supreme Court
Terms our constitutional decisionmaking reflects a greater
conservatism. '
In these comments I maintain that contemporary American con-
stitutional adjudication follows a model directed away from the ex-
pansion of individual civil rights and liberties and towards the
preservation of the status quo embodied in majoritarian legislation.
We are in a process of radical redefinition of the theory of our consti-
tutional democracy. I will suggest that contemporary constitutional
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.S. 1977, Georgetown University,
J.D. 1980, Cornell Law School.
I There has been much scholarly discussion of the recent conservative direction in politics
and in constitutional law. See, e.g., DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 243 (1987). The
term "conservatism" has been used in a number of senses. Held refers to two understandings
of the word: "[A] laissez-faire or free market society is the key objective along with a 'minimal
state.' The political programme of the New Right includes: the extension of the market to
more and more areas of life .... Id. See also ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA (1974). Held, however, also notes the existence of another group that "believe[s] in
the primacy of tradition, order and authority because [it] fear[s] the social consequences of
rampant laissez-faire policies." HELD, supra at 243 n.1.
With regard to constitutional law, the term has been used in varying senses: Substantively,
conservatism has been used to describe a preference for limited government. But it has also
been used in a distinctly different sense to describe a theory about the proper sources for con-
stitutional change, including principles favoring tradition, originalism, and arguments for judi-
cial restraint. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (1991); see generally David Chang, Discriminatory
Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Jus-
tices? 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (1991); James Boyle, A Process ofDenial: Bork and Post-Modern
Conservatism, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 263 (1991).
The varying senses of conservatism have led to the problem that conservativism makes a
claim for limited government, while opposing expansion of constitutionalism-the very mech-
anism of our political system for limiting government. Opposition to constitutionalism ap-
pears to derive from conservatism in the second sense.
In these comments I will return to the question of what we mean by constitutional democ-
racy. I will show that an analysis of the rhetoric of recent constitutional decisionmaking
reveals a strange understanding of constitutionalism as being incompatible with democracy.
See infra part III.
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adjudication embodies a distinct theory of democracy understood not
as constitutional but as simply majoritarian.
My comments respond primarily to George Fletcher's paper
Constitutional Identity, which proposes a principle of constitutional
adjudication grounded in culture or national identity.2 I agree that
national identity informs constitutional adjudication, and will pursue
this thesis further. I will propose the following relation between na-
tional identity and our constitutional adjudication: National identity
operates as a justification for, or reactionary argument against pro-
gress in constitutional theory. By progress I mean expansion in the
protection of individual rights and liberties. I conceive of the emerg-
ing principle of American constitutional adjudication as "reactionary
constitutional interpretation." 3
I. TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Fletcher proposes the following relation of national identity to
constitutional adjudication. "[T]he acceptable way to resolve the dis-
putes and to explain the results is to turn 'inward' and reflect upon the
legal culture in which the dispute is embedded." 4
Fletcher offers a number of examples: a German decision regard-
ing abortion,5 a Hungarian decision regarding capital punishment,6
and American decisions concerning police interrogation,7 flag burn-
ing, and religious liberty. 9 These decisions, Fletcher contends, can be
2 George P. Fletcher, Constitutional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 737 (1993).
3 In these comments I am deeply indebted to Albert Hirschman who has described and
critiqued reactionary argument as a rhetorical device in political discourse. See ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION (1991). Though Hirschman discusses the role of
this rhetoric in political argument, in these comments I maintain it is equally apt in the analy-
sis of recent constitutional decisionmaking.
4 Fletcher, supra note 2, at 737.
5 Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 39 Entscheidungen
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts BVerfGE 1 (F.R.G.). Judge Barak and Professors Nino, Rous-
seau and Schlink have addressed the question of the sources of authoritative constitutional
meaning. Each of their papers points to principles justifying judicial review, but also con-
straining constitutional interpretation. I will not address that question directly. See Aharon
Barak, Hermeneutics and Constitutional Interpretation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 767 (1993); Car-
los S. Nino, A Philosophical Reconstruction of Judicial Review, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 799
(1993); Dominique Rousseau, The Constitutional Judge: Master or Slave of the Constitution?,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 775 (1993); Bernhard Schlink, German Constitutional Culture in Transi-
tion, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 711 (1993).
6 Judgment of Oct. 24, 1990 (The Death Penalty Case), Alkotmfinybir6sig [Constitutional
Law Court], 1990 Magyar Kozl6ny [MK.] (Hungarian Gazette) 107 (Hung.) [hereinafter
Death Penalty Case] (unofficial translation on file at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law;
pinpoint citations will be to the unofficial translation).
7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (recognizing flag burning as protected
speech); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (same).
9 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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best understood to reflect notions of cultural identity. Just as a Ger-
man court identifies with a "life-affirming current" in German cul-
ture, 10 so too an American court aligns itself with an "American
mode" of treating suspects." These decisions, it is suggested, reflect
the identity of our national systems.
Put this way, the proposed principle sounds in false dichotomies:
constitutional law versus culture or national identity. 2 Yet without
such a dichotomy, as a principle of adjudication legal culture appears
circular.' 3  Isn't constitutional adjudication itself part of national
identity or culture?1 4 And is it not particularly so in the case of the
United States? 5
In constitutional decisionmaking, legal tradition and national
identity cannot be understood as distinct. The question is how na-
tional identity informs constitutional adjudication, and vice versa.
The question is a complex one when, as in Eastern Europe or in the
United States today, we need to be able to explain substantial consti-
tutional change.
As a practical matter, a principle of constitutional identity does
not resolve the questions now before the courts. In a recent case con-
cerning the death penalty, Hungary's high court had before it a choice
of identities.'6 In Eastern Europe, generally, the choice of identity is
either a return to pre-Stalinist tradition, or westward to a modern
European tradition.17 The Hungarian death penalty decision is not
10 Fletcher, supra note 2, at 739.
11 Id. at 738.
12 Fletcher would criticize law versus politics as a false dichotomy. See id. at 737.
13 Judge Barak also understands constitutional interpretation as expressive of tradition or
culture. He refers to the "values and policies that establish the identity of the community."
Barak, supra note 5, at 770.
14 Dominique Rousseau offers a sensible understanding of the legitimacy of judicial review:
"The control of the constitutionality of laws is legitimate because it produces a definition of
democracy that legitimates it." Rousseau, supra note 5, at 795. A broader reading of Domi-
nique Rousseau's hypothesis is that constitutional interpretation is best understood as forming
part of a broader system of constitutional democracy which the judiciary has a role in creating
and which, in turn, affects our understanding of judicial review.
The legitimacy question aside, if this also sounds circular it is because of the hermeneutic
problem of attempting to understand the principles of constitutional interpretation indepen-
dently from the conception of democracy which judicial review itself has a role in creating.
15 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); see gen-
erally, SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
16 Death Penalty Case, supra note 6, at 3.
17 See Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 447, 476-77, 481 (1991) (discussing the attraction of historic pre-communist and contem-
porary international community models in the Eastern European constitution drafting
process).
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well explained simply by a principle of constitutional identity.'
As in Eastern Europe, the United States is now at a constitu-
tional juncture point. As we celebrate the bicentennial of the world's
most enduring constitution, we are in a period of reconstitution in
numerous areas: criminal process, privacy, speech, and religion-sub-
jects that imply First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment protections.' 9 In light of this reconstitution, the ques-
tion is not how to explain constitutional adjudication generally, but
instead how to explain constitutional change.
Fletcher suggests our jurisprudence continues to reflect a tradi-
tion of dissent and individual autonomy. The balance, he maintains,
still favors "individual freedom" over "collective interest" and "na-
tional pride."' 20 The recent decisions concerning flag burning, accord-
ing to Fletcher, continue to reflect an American tradition regarding
dissent, privileging Speech as the protected medium.2'
Yet the extent to which the tradition of dissent continues to in-
form the Rehnquist Court's constitutional adjudication is debatable.
I understand the changes in our constitutional jurisprudence to go
beyond mere clause-shifting 22 to the very heart of our constitutional
identity. My understanding of recent Supreme Court Terms is as a
revolution in our constitutional tradition, and relatedly, of our theory
of constitutional democracy. I suggest that decisionmaking concern-
ing criminal procedure, and freedom of expression and of conscience
reflects an entirely revised constitutional identity.
II. REACTIONARY CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
I suggest the recent change in our constitutional jurisprudence is
well explained by a principle I conceive of as "reactionary constitu-
tional interpretation." I will set out elements of the principle of deci-
sionmaking, show how it explains contemporary constitutional
adjudication, and finally critique the theory of constitutional democ-
racy underlying the reactionary principle.
18 In the Death Penalty Case, the court elected against.reversion to its premodern national
identity and instead aligned itself with the identity and norms of the European Community.
Death Penalty Case, supra note 6, at 9-10.
19 See infra part III. There are also other areas in considerable flux.
20 Fletcher, supra note 2 at 741.
21 Id. Though regarding religious liberty, Fletcher would probably concede there has been
a limitation and an asserted shift to the protection of speech rights. Id. at 744-45 (discussing
the peyote decision' in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)).
22 Id. at 741.
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My sense is that our constitutional identity had been in steady
development,2 3 but that in recent Terms this development has stopped
short. My interpretation of the new judicial conservatism draws on a
thesis of Albert Hirschman's concerning the rhetoric of resistance to
political change.24 In The Rhetoric of Reaction, Hirschman describes
a number of arguments against political change, and offers a typology
of arguments based on reaction to proposed change.25 One of these he
terms the "jeopardy thesis." Under the "jeopardy thesis," the argu-
ment against proposed change is that the change involves unaccept-
able costs by jeopardizing a pre-existing national interest. Recent
constitutional decisionmaking reflects this type of "reactionary" argu-
ment-an argument resulting from a reaction to proposed constitu-
tional change.26 The argument is that proposed change jeopardizes
majority interests and national tradition.
Questions about constitutional rights are increasingly conceived
of as finite zero-sum games.27 Granting a right to an individual is
characterized as, and equated with, taking away an interest from the
majority. Or, it is characterized as endangering a prior tradition.
The appeal of zero-sum constitutional analysis is that it offers a
constraint in constitutional interpretation. A reactionary approach to
constitutional interpretation limits potentially infinitely expandable
rights; as such reactionary constitutional analysis offers a response to
the interpretivist/noninterpretivist debate which has dominated the
past decade. In a curious revisiting of our early political and constitu-
tional history, where reactionary arguments were invoked against the
23 Along the lines described by Dominique Rousseau. See Rousseau, supra note 5.
24 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 1-10.
25 Hirschman terms these: perversity, futility, and jeopardy. Id. at 3-8. Contemporary
constitutional decisionmaking reflects elements of all of these arguments.
26 In The Rhetoric of Reaction, Hirschman writes about reactionary argument in political
discourse. Yet reactionary argument is even more powerful in the adjudicative setting. Princi-
ples of adjudication such as stare decisis lend themselves to reactionary arguments. But stare
decisis contemplates deference to a judicially recognized interest rather than a simple political
interest. For a recent case where the Supreme Court deferred to a political majority over its
precedent and the principle of stare decisis, see Payne v. Tennessee 11l S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
27 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 8, 122; Albert 0. Hirschman, Good News is Not Bad
News, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 11, 1990, at 20. Under this model, every action has an equal
and opposite reaction. It is a return to a scientific model of law drawing on Newtonian phys-
ics. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 8. But reactionary rhetoric in adjudication also draws
upon games theory, and a conception of constitutional disputes as two-person games. See
generally JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND EcO-
NOMIC BEHAVIOR (1964); R. B. BRAITHWAITE, THEORY OF GAMES AS A TOOL FOR THE
MORAL PHILOSOPHER (1959). It also draws upon military or conflict theory which has been
characterized as "adversarial, zero-sum, and paradoxical." Edward N. Luttwak, From Geo-
politics to Geo-Economics, THE NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 1990, at 17.
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expansion of equality rights-in the name of liberty2 -today the
Supreme Court argues expansion of liberty imperils equality.29 Lib-
erty is seen as jeopardizing democracy. In other words, constitution-
alism-but only at democracy's expense. Yet, constitutionalism
ought not be considered to be had at the expense of democracy.
III. SELECT CASES IN REACTIONARY CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Below I offer a number of illustrations of the reactionary consti-
tutional interpretation principle. Many decisions reflect this concep-
tion and form of analysis. I have selected examples from four subject
areas: privacy rights, criminal procedure, freedom of expression, and
freedom of conscience.
A. Privacy
In the area of privacy, expanding individual autonomy is charac-
terized as posing a danger to the interests of the people. Perhaps the
leading case is Bowers v. Hardwick, which rejected a claim to a right
of homosexual privacy. 0 In Bowers, protecting individual sexual
preference was characterized by the Court as a threat to both tradi-
tion 31 and majority will.3 2
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, a recent
case concerning the right to die, the Court characterized the constitu-
tional question as a conflict between the individual, his or her family,
and the interests of the people as reflected in anti-suicide legislation.33
For the Court, the majority's interest overrode the individual's inter-
est, even though it was the individual's interest in his or her own life
which was at issue!34 By giving greater weight to society's longstand-
ing prohibitions against suicide, the balance was stacked in favor of
past majorities as tradition. Constitutionalism was understood to
conflict with democracy. But that is not the American theory of
constitutionalism.
28 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
29 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). But see ROBERT A. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 44, 50 (1985) (arguing liberty is not threatened by
equality).
30 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
31 Id. at 192-94.
32 Id. at 196. See also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (Bork makes exactly this argument regarding the privacy right
at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
33 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
34 Id. at 2852-53.
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B. Criminal Process
In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Court held there was
no constitutional necessity for a probable cause finding immediately
following a warrantless arrest. 3" The Court characterized its task as
balancing "competing concerns": the "concerns" of the arrestee ver-
sus those of the public. 36 The McLaughlin Court found that the ar-
restee's concerns were trumped by the threat to the people.37
In United States v. Salerno, the Court for the first time upheld
indefinite pretrial detention without a right to bail.38 Notwithstand-
ing the dissent's invocation of American "tradition" as inapposite to
"the police state,' 39 the majority held the "individual's strong interest
in liberty" subordinate to the "greater needs of society."40
In a case upholding the use of victim impact evidence in the sen-
tencing of a capital defendant,4" and overruling precedent barring the
use of such evidence, Justice Scalia's concurrence declared it a general
principle of constitutional adjudication that the "settled practices and
expectations of a democratic society should generally not be disturbed
by the courts."42 Judicial protection of Eighth Amendment rights
were analyzed as incompatible with democracy.
Decisions in the criminal area are characterized as struggles be-
tween individual claims and the interests of the people, locked in an
inexorable zero-sum conflict. Democracy is equated with simple ma-
jority rule to which individual liberties must be subordinated.43 Con-
stitutionalism cannot be had at democracy's expense.
C. Speech
Turning to freedom of expression, First Amendment doctrine re-
flects similar reactionary constitutional interpretation. In R.A. V v.
35 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991).
36 Id. at 1668.
37 The change in constitutional rhetoric is also evidenced in the privacy area, as seen in the
abortion debate. A majority of the Court avoids the use of the term "right" regarding choice,
but instead uses the term "interest." See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989).
38 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
39 Id. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 750-51.
41 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
42 Id. at 2614 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204
(1991) (limiting the right to counsel during a judicial proceeding) (the dissent characterized
the decision as revealing "a preference for an inquisitorial system [of justice]." Id. at 2212
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
43 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991); see also Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
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City of St. Paul,' the majority's opinion invalidating a cross burning
statute characterized the interests of the cross burner and the bias
crime victim as a zero-sum conflict.45 According to Justice Scalia's
opinion, protecting the victim of bias crimes necessarily implies cen-
sorship of the racist speaker.46 Though Texas v. Johnson,"' a case
involving flag burning, upheld individual First Amendment rights, it
was by a scant majority.4" A three Justice dissent declared that the
"high purpose[ ] of a democratic society is to legislate against conduct
that is regarded as evil and profoundly offensive to the majority of
people .... 9
During the last two Terms, in a large number of cases regarding
freedom of speech, the Court has strictly upheld federal, state and
municipal legislation over claims of individual expression. In the most
notorious of these, Rust v. Sullivan, the Court conditioned receipt of
governmental financial benefits on limiting the dissemination of infor-
mation on abortion.50 Rust, however, merely built upon prior prece-
dent. In the previous Term, the Court had upheld city regulations of
an outdoor concert51 and a postal office forum 2 without calling for a
compelling, or even a significant governmental justification. Further,
in upholding the regulation of nude dancing, Justice Scalia wrote of a
"long tradition of laws against public nudity, which have never been
thought to run afoul of traditional understanding of 'the freedom of
speech.'
The speech cases, like the privacy and criminal decisions above,
characterize constitutional rights as jeopardizing democracy. Consti-
tutionalism-but not at democracy's expense.
44 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
45 Id. at 2550.
46 "(T]he only interest distinctively served by the content limitation is that of displaying
the city council's special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled out." Id. As the
four Justices in dissent contend, this question need not have been addressed by the majority, as
the particular statute at issue was otherwise constitutionally vulnerable. Id. at 2550-51
(White, J., dissenting).
47 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
48 Fletcher notes the 5-4 majority in Johnson. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 740.
49 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
50 Rust v. Sullivan, I11 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (conditioning federal funding on censorship of
viewpoint favoring abortion).
51 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
52 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
53 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2464 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) The
three member plurality referred to the protection of morality as a "substantial government
interest." Id. at 2462.
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D. Religious Liberty
keactionary argument is perhaps most notable in the area of reli-
gion. In the landmark decision Employment Division v. Smith, the
Court jettisoned established precedent requiring individualized ex-
emptions from political obligations on religious grounds.5 4 Overturn-
ing a number of cases requiring a compelling state justification to
defeat individual religious liberty claims," the Court upheld a state's
prohibition on drug use as a condition to unemployment benefits, over
the claim to an exemption based upon religious grounds.56 Smith il-
lustrates beautifully the paradoxical thinking characteristic of reac-
tionary constitutional interpretation. For the Court, requiring
exemptions on religious liberty grounds jeopardizes democracy:
"'The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the
relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen
from the discharge of political responsibilities.' ,17 To require exemp-
tions as a constitutional matter is considered to threaten democracy:
Exemptions nurture pluralism, and pluralism, in turn, is seen as a
danger to the rule of law. "Any society adopting such a system would
be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to
the society's diversity of religious beliefs ....""
It is because "'we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people
of almost every conceivable religious preference,' and precisely be-
cause we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford
the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid ... every regulation that
does not protect an interest of the highest order."59 Expansion of
constitutional liberties again is viewed as a threat to democracy. 60
54 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
55 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
56 Fletcher views the case not so much as a step backward for religious dissent but rather
as a consolidation of speech rights. Fletcher, supra note 2 at 744.
57 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 3 10 U.S.
586, 594-95 (1940)).
58 Id. at 888.
59 Id. (first emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
606 (1961)). The Court's negative vision of pluralism is further indicated in its telling choice
of terms-its reference to religious diversity as "divergence." Id. See generally, Richard K.
Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the Discourse Ideal: Countering Division of Employment v.
Smith, a Parable of Pagans, Politics, and Majoritarian Rule, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 388, 427-28
(1991).
60 Compare West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943) ("The
freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with rights asserted by
any other individual.... ET]he refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony [saluting
the flag] does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so.").
Tradition serves a similar function in the Court's adjudication of the establishment clause
side of the religion cases. In recent Terms, claims to be free from establishment of religion
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E. Our Democracy: Majoritarian or Pluralist?
The above decisions concerning privacy, criminal process, speech
and religion reveal an emerging judicial conception of individual
rights as fundamentally incompatible and in inexorable conflict with
the interests of the political majority. The contemporary constitu-
tional paradox is that the protection of constitutional rights and liber-
ties is no longer considered to strengthen, but instead to endanger
democracy. The jeopardy thesis is expressed graphically and omi-
nously in a recent custodial interrogation decision: " 'This Court is
forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and
the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is
added.' "61
CONCLUSION
Reactionary judicial analysis employed to resist expansion in the
protection of individual rights-in the name of democracy-is a the-
ory of constitutionalism embodying a distinct understanding of de-
mocracy. This conception of democracy is one of a democracy of
naked majority rule.62 Further, it is not just simple majoritarianism;
in the Court's reliance on tradition, the balance is being struck in
favor of past majorities.63 The message to the fledgling democracies
of Latin America and Eastern Europe is that of a shrinking theory of
constitutional democracy. The theory of constitutional democracy
appears limited to the legitimacy of decisions made by representatives
have been repeatedly defeated by asserted interests in majoritarian traditions. See, e.g., Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-85 (1984) (Christmas displays as traditional, not religious sym-
bols); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983) (legislative prayers as traditional prac-
tices); see also Ruti Teitel, Original Intent, History and Levy's Establishment Clause, 15 LAw
& Soc. INQUIRY 591, 605 (1991) ("Inquiry into longstanding history or 'tradition' is the
Supreme Court's fundamental standard in the jurisprudence of the religion clauses.").
61 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2211 (1991) (quoting Douglas v. Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157, 181 (1943)) (regarding the right to counsel during a judicial proceeding).
62 This understanding is expressed repeatedly in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Re-
sources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Court declared it is the "unavoidable
consequence of democratic government" that leaves accommodation to the political process.
Id. at 890. But it also appears in decisionmaking in other areas of constitutional law; in a
recent case concerning desegregation in the public schools, Justice Scalia's concurrence
presented a conception of democracy as synonymous with electorate choice. See Freeman v.
Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1454 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). In its emerging constitutional inter-
pretation, the Court reconstitutes its own role, while simultaneously reconstituting the theory
of our democracy generally, as Dominique Rousseau's hypothesis suggests. See Rousseau,
supra note 5, at 795.
63 This phenomenon has the effect of engendering a constitutional interpretation of greater
conservatism. See Teitel, supra note 60.
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fairly chosen. The effect is of a rolling back in constitutionalism. 6
Even as our society becomes more pluralistic, as we talk of "ex-
ploding diversity," and of "minority-majorities," the Court sadly con-
cludes that there is somehow an unavoidable incompatibility between
the protection of fundamental individual liberties and majority rule.s"
Our constitutional democracy is being reinterpreted as a reactionary
constitutional identity, tilted away from the possibilities of a dynamic
national identity.
64 It is a shift in exactly the opposite direction of that in France, as discussed by Domi-
nique Rousseau. See Rousseau, supra note 5, at 784-87.
65 As seen in Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 ("[the] danger [of anarchy] increases in direct propor-
tion to [a] society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress
none of them."). On the compatibility of constitutionalism and democracy see Stephen
Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 19
(Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). On the possibilities of pluralist democracy see ROB-
ERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL (1982).

